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POINT II. 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE MAJORITY 
OPINION WHEREIN IT IS STATED THAT THE EVIDENCE IS 
IN SHARP DISPUTE BOTH AS TO THE AMOUNT OF PRE-
CIPITATION AND THE TIME THAT HAD ELAPSED. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCUSED THE ADMISSION 
OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE. 
POINT I. 
THE COURT HAS ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED 
A HAZARDOUS CONDITION EXISTED IN THE 
ENTRANCEWAY OF DEFENDANT'S STORE. 
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Henroid cor-
rectly characterizes the majority opinion when he says: 
ul am of the opinion that in allowing recovery 
under the facts of this case, we approach a rule of 
absolute insurability on the part of merchants 
whenever it storms and persons use their entrances, 
if a mat is not placed therein-a circumstance 
which, in my opinion, may or may not be evi-
dence of negligence, and which may or may not 
be an exercise of greater care than that which 
such merchants need exercise." 
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Worthen very 
ably substantiates and amplifies this. 
We respectfully submit that the majority opinion 
both amends and ignores the facts in the record and in 
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addition supplements the record by facts not found there-
in. We do not quarrel with the proposition stated by 
the Court that: 
ccw e are only required to determine whether 
there was any legitimate basis in the evidence upon 
which reasonable minds could believe that the 
defendant failed to meet its standard of reasonable 
care under the circumstances for the safety of its 
customers." 
But we do quarrel, however, with the use of generaliza-
tions not properly supported by the evidence. 
It appears from the opinion that this Court has as-
sumed that terrazzo when wet has the characteristic of 
being slippery in excess of that of other substances, such 
as cement. Perhaps this has occurred as a result of what 
the court and others have assumed to be a fact. In the 
record before this Court, it stands as undisputed and not 
merely assumed that the terrazzo in the entranceway of 
defendant's store was not any more slippery when wet 
than the sidewalk in front. Every day experience illus-
trates that many things we assume to be factual are found 
not to be so when subjected to scientific measurement. 
The record shows without contradiction that in the in-
stant case, the average coefficient of friction as scientifical-
ly measured of the terrazzo in the entranceway was 
greater than that of the sidewalk in front of the store 
or was just about identical when wet (R. 110-119) . 
Can it not be said that the majority opinion can now 
be used to provide a standard of care and allow recovery 
against any person, firm or corporation, including the 
City of Salt Lake, when sidewalks or cement walks are 
wet? Or must storekeepers be held to extraordinary care 
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in cases admittedly not of the foreign substance type? 
For example, if Mrs. DeWeese had fallen on the sidewalk 
and had brought suit against the City, would it not be 
correct to say from the reasoning of the majority opinion 
and the facts contained in the record that the City must 
have known of the characteristics of cement to become 
slippery when wet and since it is the custom of stores 
with terrazzo entranceways, which also become slippery 
when wet, to use mats or grits to prevent slipperiness 
during stormy weather, that a jury question was posed as 
to whether the City had discharged its duty to use rea-
sonable diligence and watchfulness for storms and to take 
such measures as the exercise of reasonable care under the 
circumstances would dictate? 
The only conclusion that can be reasonably taken 
from the opinion is that storekeepers have adopted more 
than the ordinary care by the use of mats and grits, and 
must therefore be held to that standard even though their 
terrazzo entranceways are not any more slippery when 
wet than the sidewalk in front of the store. Contrary to 
the holding of this Court in the recent case of Gaddis v. 
Ladies Literary Club, 4 Utah (2) 121, 288 P. (2) 785, we 
are now faced with a rule of law insuring the safety of 
business invitees in a store above and beyond that required 
in all other instances. 
The foregoing presentment of a case against the City 
of Salt Lake becomes even stronger when one considers 
that the sidewalk is directly exposed to the weather, but 
the terrazzo becomes damp only because of a few min-
utes traffic by customers. 
The majority opinion chooses part of the facts from 
the record and asserts the following: 
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ttThe evidence clearly shows that the de-
fendant knew of the characteristic of terrazzo to 
become slippery when wet, and that it was its 
custom, and the custom of other stores with simi-
lar surfacing to use rubber mats or grit to prevent 
slipperiness during stormy weather. In view of 
this a jury question was posed as to whether the 
defendant discharged its duty to use reasonable 
diligence and watchfulness for storms, and to take 
such measures as the exercise of reasonable care 
under the circumstances would dictate." 
We respectfully submit that this paragraph should 
be reworded and to properly reflect the evidence should 
state that the evidence clearly shows that both the de-
fendant and plaintiff knew of the characteristics of ter-
razzo and of cement sidewalks and that both became 
slippery when wet. Further that terrazzo is used by some 
eighty-five per cent of the stores in Salt Lake City for 
entranceways and does not in itself create a hazardous 
condition even when wet. That reasonable care in the 
use of terrazzo in an entranceway is exhibited when 
abrasives are present in the terrazzo to reduce slipperiness, 
and that in addition thereto, it was the custom to use 
rubber mats or grits to prevent slipperiness during stormy 
weather, but that it was not negligence to fail to use them 
unless the terrazzo had been improperly constructed and 
was in fact smoother than a sidewalk in front of a store 
due to wear or some other reason. 
If the majority opinion measures the standard of care 
for storekeepers higher than that of any other persons, 
firms or corporations where invitees may be confronted 
with a surface more slippery when polished, or more slip-
pery when wet, or more slippery when clean, then the 
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rule of law in this State indeed becomes unique. This is 
even more apparent when one asks what advice counsel 
for storekeepers can give their clients to protect their 
interests, since they are distinctly marked as a class against 
whom the rule heretofore governing recovery for slipping 
and falling cases is relaxed. A cursory review of the 
court calendars and the appellate decisions by number will 
indicate a great increase in such cases, and the majority 
opinion in the instant case in effect provides a new rule 
of law not unlike the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as far 
as the storekeeper is concerned. The dissenting opinion 
of Mr. Justice Worthen ably and fully expresses the over-
whelming weight of authority in the United States and 
the rule of law as it existed in this jurisdiction prior to the 
majority opinion in the instant case. 
We also desire to point out that if terrazzo is in such 
common use by stores for entranceways, that in itself 
should be indicative of a compliance with a standard of 
care rather than a violation thereof. 
POINT II. 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE MA-
JORITY OPINION WHEREIN IT IS STATED THAT 
THE EVIDENCE IS IN SHARP DISPUTE BOTH AS 
TO THE AMOUNT OF PRECIPITATION AND THE 
TIME THAT HAD ELAPSED. 
Plaintiff herself introduced a weather report. That 
report showed precipitation beginning at 8:12 P.M. and 
ending at 8:34 P.M. The plaintiff also testified that there 
was no precipitation until she was on the bus and on her 
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way to town. If the Court can recognize uthat in this 
mountain valley storms are sometimes spotty and irregu-
lar as to the time and place of starting, duration and 
amount of precipitation," it should be said that the Court 
must recognize, in view of the absence of testimony to 
the contrary, that precipitation began in town in front 
of defendant's store at 8:12 P.M. By plaintiff's weather 
report, the ustorm" lasted twenty-two minutes. It ap-
pears from the figures, or those used by the majority 
opinion, possibly twenty-five to thirty minutes after the 
storm began the accident occurred, so by plaintiff's own 
evidence the storm must have ended before her arrival 
at the scene of her fall. 
The precipitation referred to by the Court as a 
ustorm" is given a dignity which the evidence cannot sup-
port. The official weather report calls it ua trace," uan 
amount too small to measure." Plaintiff testified as well 
that there was no great amount of water nor any snow 
on the sidewalk. Further the ustorm" was not of a suf-
ficient intensity to give plaintiff concern about rubbers 
or galoshes for her feet, and yet the Court finds that the 
storm was sufficient to require rubber mats or feldspar 
to be placed in the entranceway by the defendants. If 
it is recognized that storms are spotty and irregular in 
this valley, it would seem that such would more properly 
indicate no precipitation occurring at the downtown level 
until the time reported by the weather bureau. If assump-
tions must be made and facts unsupported by the record 
recognized, then we respectfully submit that since the 
question of notice or knowledge of precipitation is based 
upon the elapse of such a very few minutes, it must be 
also recognized that some of that time would be un-
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doubtedly required within which the store officials could 
notify personnel and have the mats placed in position. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCUSED THE 
ADMISSION OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE. 
The majority opinion has informed the defendant 
that it is doubtful that defendant is in a position to com-
plain of certain evidence being admitted purportedly be-
cause of a failure to move to strike certain questions and 
answers. Since the Court set out that certain testimony 
and then declared: 
ecHo wever, we need not concern ourselves with 
niceties with respect thereto for reasons presently 
to be stated." 
we feel this calls for comment, and we again set out the 
questions and answers cited by the Court, together with 
part of its comment: 
Did you observe whether the substance had an 
abrasive in it-that terrazzo surface at W. T. 
Grant's?" 
Mr. Aadnesen, defendant's counsel: uObject 
to that as immaterial." 
The Court: uThat may be answered eyes' or 
cno.' " 
* * * * * 
uQ. I am talking about W. T. Grant-Entrance 
to Grant's store at the present time, Mr. Caf-
fall." 
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uA. Oh, yes, that has London Grits in it." 
After a further question and answer, 
Mr. Aadnesen: uMay the record show that my 
objection goes to this entire line as to what 
W. T. Grant has?" 
to which the Court answered: uYes." Upon the 
next question pertaining to the surfacing at 
Grant's, an. objection that it was immaterial was 
sustained." 
Of course, the first question could only be answered 
ceyes" or uno" but it was still inadmissible. No opinion 
was being sought to which an objection had to be made 
after the uyes" or uno" answer was given. The subse-
quent question designated with a uQ" only because of the 
form used by the court reporter was not a question at 
all, but an explanation of the original question and the 
original objection precluded it. Perhaps we do not need 
to concern ourselves with the niceties of this testimony. 
The Court has set it out in rather full measure, and cer-
tainly the entire question, whether answered uyes" or uno" 
or whether explained was still inadmissible, and for the 
Court to now say that it can be excused because a motion 
to strike should have been made seems completely er-
roneous. The very statement by the Court that the 
question could be answered uyes" or uno" would indicate 
that the objection, timely made, was overruled. 
Further the intent behind all of the testimony, in-
cluding these questions and answers, unmistakably appears 
as· an attempt to compare W. T. Grant's store and J. C. 
Penney's. The Court has properly set out the rule, and 
then appears to have ignored it: 
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ttThere can be no doubt that it would not 
have been proper to use the procedure of any par-
ticular individual, or of theW. T. Grant Co. store, 
either generally, or in connection with this particu-
lar storm, as a standard of care upon which to 
determine whether the Penney Company was 
negligent." 
CONCLUSION 
The court has erroneously assumed a hazardous con-
dition existed in the entranceway of defendant's store. 
This assumption is unsupported by the evidence in the 
record and creates a higher standard of care for store-
keepers than the law should and heretofore did require. 
The evidence introduced by plaintiff herself negates the 
possibility of precipitation for a period of time prior to 
her fall sufficient to support a :finding of knowledge, con-
structive or actual, and also requires a higher standard of 
care for the storekeeper than for the customer. The evi-
dence admitted was properly objected to and the intent 
and import thereof was unmistakably an attempt to use 
the procedure of W. T. Grant Company as a standard of 
care upon which to determine whether the defendant, 
J. C. Penney Company, was negligent. 
We request that defendant's petition for rehearing 
be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
GRANT C. AADNESEN 
Attorneys /or Defendant 
and Appellant 
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